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This paper considers the role of international labour rights in an era of globalisation. It begins 
from Patrick Macklem’s definition of that role in terms of providing the international legal 
order with a measure of normative legitimacy. It then interrogates the relationship between 
sovereignty and international labour rights in an era of globalization, highlighting the 
particular significance, in this context, of the voluntary surrender by nation states of elements 
of their sovereignty. It questions whether Macklem has given due consideration to this 
phenomenon, and to its consequences for the rights and interests of workers; whether, 
therefore, he has succeeded in providing an account of international labour rights that is at 
once descriptive and normative, as he intends it to be. Having drawn attention to the 
limitations of international labour rights, the paper concludes by commenting briefly on the 
desirability of a body of transnational labour law, of which international labour law would 





In The Sovereignty of Human Rights, Patrick Macklem’s primary aim is to provide an 
account of international human rights that is ‘distinctively legal’; one which comprehends 
international human rights as an element of the wider international legal order.1 I will 
describe in greater detail what I understand Macklem to mean when he speaks of providing 
an account of the field; for the moment, let us note his stated intention that this should be at 
once both descriptive and normative, speaking both to the nature and to the purpose of the 
rights in question. It is in purported fulfilment of this objective that Macklem develops his 
central argument, that international human rights are best understood as international legal 
entitlements, which ‘monitor the distribution and exercise of sovereign power to which 
international law extends legal validity’, ‘mitigate adverse consequences produced by the 
                                                 
* School of Law, University of Glasgow. I’m very grateful to David Dyzenhaus and Claire La Hovary for 
comments on an earlier draft. Note that this paper was completed on 20 June 2016, shortly before the UK 
electorate voted narrowly in favour of leaving the European Union. 
 
1 Patrick Macklem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 2. 
2 
 
international deployment of legal sovereignty’, and ‘express – imperfectly – what is required 
of the international legal order to enable it to acquire a measure of normative legitimacy’.2 In 
the scheme of the book, international labour rights figure as one example of several which 
Macklem uses to explain and substantiate his main thesis. In a chapter entitled, ‘International 
Rights at Work’, he argues that international labour rights vest the international legal order 
with a measure of normative legitimacy by fulfilling various functions, all of which may be 
grouped together under the notion of monitoring the exercise, and the distribution, of 
sovereign power to which international law extends legal validity.3  
 
In what follows, I take this claim about the legitimising function of international labour rights 
as the starting point for my discussion. Having commented briefly on the broad ambition of 
the book to provide an account of international human rights, I focus my attention on the 
relation of sovereignty to international labour rights in an era of globalisation, highlighting 
here the significance of the voluntary surrender by nation states of elements of their 
sovereignty.4 As a result of such surrender, actors, actions and spaces appear which do not 
fall squarely – or at all – within the jurisdiction of any nation state. National governments 
take steps to weaken existing worker protections, not in a bid to attract capital investment, but 
because they are legally bound to do so – under the terms of international trade agreements, 
or loan agreements, to which they are signatories. International and regional legal and 
institutional frameworks are developed which allow for the re-characterization of labour as 
services, and the consequent circumvention of otherwise applicable labour laws. As a result 
of these steps, companies and transnational corporations (TNCs) are further empowered to 
configure relations with workers to their own benefit. Referring both to Macklem’s 
description of international labour rights and his illustration of those rights ‘at work’ in the 
international legal order, I raise the question whether he has given due consideration to this 
aspect of the relation of sovereignty to labour rights, and to its consequences for the rights 
and interests of workers. Though he goes some way to acknowledging the capacity of free 
trade agreements and other aspects of the liberalization of trade and finance to disadvantage 
workers, it seems to me that he then overestimates the capacity of international human rights 
to guard against this danger, or to mitigate its consequences. In this respect, Macklem’s 
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account may be contrasted with the work of those scholars who have identified a need, in an 
era of globalization, for transnational labour law, of which international labour rights would 
form only one part. 
 
 
1. Accounting for International Labour Rights    
 
In introducing and developing his theory of international human rights, Macklem situates 
himself as charting a path between moral and political conceptions of the field. He 
characterises moral accounts as dominant when it comes to identifying the normative 
foundations of international human rights law. According to such accounts, he suggests, ‘the 
existence or non-existence of a human right rests on abstract features of what it means to be 
human and the obligations to which these features give rise. The mission of the field is to 
secure international legal protection of universal features of what it means to be a human 
being’.5 In contrast, political conceptions are primarily concerned to define the nature of 
human rights, which they do with reference to the function of those rights in global political 
discourse. International human rights are understood, accordingly, to represent ‘reasons that 
social, political and legal actors rely on in international arenas to advocate interfering in the 
internal affairs of a State and to provide assistance to States to promote their protection’.6 
 
The criticism that Macklem makes of each of these approaches is revealing. At the risk of 
oversimplifying his nuanced and valuable discussion, I would suggest that the key problem 
that he identifies with the moral conception is that it fails adequately to describe the law; the 
political conception, on the other hand, describes without identifying a normative account 
that is sufficiently independent of the description. ‘If human rights in international law are 
not those that moral theory generates, then moral accounts of human rights are not normative 
accounts of international human rights law’.7 ‘Relying’ as political conceptions do ‘on 
practice to identify the normative dimensions of human rights – that is, the role they should 
play in the international arena … potentially drains human rights of their capacity to act as 
instruments of critique of existing practices’.8  In Macklem’s view, then, it is clear that a 
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scholarly account of a field of law ought to have both descriptive and normative properties. 
‘An account … of the field should not conflate fact and norm by equating legal validity with 
moral legitimacy, but nor should it lose sight of the object that it seeks to describe’.9  
 
In order that his own account should adequately describe international human rights, 
Macklem begins from the positivist assertion that it is international law – and not moral 
theory or political practice – which determines the existence of international human rights.10 
A norm is an international human right if it has been enacted, promulgated, or specified as 
such in accordance with the rules that international law lays down for the creation of specific 
legal rights and obligations.11 (‘An international right to food, for example, exists because the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights enshrines such a right’.12)  
That is not the end of the story for Macklem, however, for the straightforward reason that a 
positivist account leaves the ‘content’ of international human rights underdetermined. ‘The 
interests that a human right protects, the nature of the obligations to which it gives rise, the 
actors who bear these obligations – these and other questions typically remain open to legal 
interpretation’.13 The practice of legal and political actors becomes relevant now, in 
‘illuminating a right’s content’.14 And moral theory is looked to in order to provide a 
normative account of its purpose, albeit from a perspective that is strictly internal to 
international law. ‘Human rights in international law are not so much formal expressions of 
what justice requires as a matter of abstract morality as they are legal instruments that aim to 
do justice in the actual international legal order in which we live’.15 
 
As Macklem himself highlights, the task of providing an account of a field of law that is at 
once descriptive and normative is not necessarily an easy one.16 It requires the identification 
of a normative principle or set of principles, which is in some measure independent of the 
rules at issue – so that it might serve as a means of interpreting and critiquing those rules, of 
arguing for legal reform, and of providing the ‘field’ with a measure of coherence – but 
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which, at the same time, is sufficiently closely informed by the terms of those rules that it can 
be understand adequately to describe them. Fact and norm must not be conflated, but neither 
can the distance between them be stretched so very far. With this point in mind, it may be 
noted that the ambition which Macklem ascribes to international human rights is far from 
modest. ‘Their true significance’ he writes, ‘lies in their status as international legal 
entitlements that call for radical revision of the ways in which international law organizes 
global politics into an international legal order’.17 Their ‘mission’ is to ensure the legitimacy 
of that order.18 Turning now to his treatment of international labour rights, I wish to pose the 
question whether Macklem’s account nonetheless succeeds in being at once normative and 
descriptive of those rights; alternatively, does it run the risk, as Macklem himself puts it, of 
losing sight of the object that it aims to describe? 
 
 
2.  Sovereignty and Labour Rights 
 
As the title of Macklem’s volume suggests, his theory of international human rights is 
developed with reference to the notion of sovereignty. He defines the role of such rights, as 
we have seen, in terms of monitoring the distribution and exercise of sovereign power to 
which international law extends legal validity and, by doing so, furnishing the international 
legal order with a measure of legitimacy. By the ‘distribution’ of sovereign power, Macklem 
means the determination by international law of who possesses sovereignty; what constitutes 
a state.19 When he refers to its ‘exercise’, he clarifies that he does not mean only the exercise 
of sovereign power by a state over its own people or territory.20 In addition, he identifies a 
need for international human rights to monitor and mitigate what he calls the external 
exercise of sovereignty, which he understands to include the entering into by states of legally 
binding bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
 Because international law vests States with international legal personality, a State is  
legally entitled to expand or restrict the scope of its sovereign power by entering into 
a treaty with one or more sovereign States… A treaty can create legally binding 
                                                 
17 Macklem, Sovereignty of Human Rights, supra note 1 at 1. 
18 Ibid at 2. 
19 Ibid at 45-50. 
20 Ibid at 31-7. 
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obligations on signatory States to exercise their sovereign powers in certain ways and 
not others and in relation to certain matters and not others.21  
 
When addressing international labour rights in particular, Macklem describes their role with 
reference to the internal and external exercise of sovereign power. (The ‘distribution’ of 
sovereign power is returned to in later chapters dealing with minority rights and the rights of 
indigenous peoples.22) As he explains in more detail, international labour rights: 
 ‘interrogate … the legitimacy of international legal arrangements that potentially  
authorize a State to adopt measures that adversely affect the interests of workers 
inside and outside its jurisdiction. They require States, when participating in the 
formation of such international arrangements, to take into account the labor rights of 
all individuals and not simply the rights of individuals under their domestic sovereign 
power. They require international institutions to exercise international legal authority 
in ways that respect the interests of workers. And they require States, when exercising 
domestic regulatory authority, to legislate in ways that respect the rights of workers at 
home and abroad.’23 
 
By way of illustrating the descriptive as well as the normative force of his theory in this 
context, Macklem provides a number of examples of labour rights performing the identified 
functions. Noting that economic globalization has ‘increased the power and managerial 
freedom of capital’, and that this has occurred as a result of processes validated by 
international law, for example, he suggests that international labour rights ‘enable employees 
to offset some of the [consequent] inequality of bargaining power they experience in the 
workplace’.24 As a result of the regional and international liberalization of trade, services and 
investment, also facilitated (‘validated’) by international law, the exit-opportunities of capital 
have increased, he observes, so that states have become reluctant to create and enforce 
worker-protective norms for fear of capital-flight. Here, international labour rights again 
mitigate the potential for workers to be disadvantaged, he argues, by restricting the ability of 
states to deregulate in a bid to attract or retain foreign direct investment.25 This is particularly 
                                                 
21 Ibid at 34. 
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visible in the context of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements to which labour ‘side 
agreements’ are often appended, committing the parties, for example, to respect ‘core’ labour 
rights (so designated by the ILO).26 Increasingly, too, he points out, international 
development finance institutions require borrowers to comply with international labour rights 
as a condition of their loan agreements.27 
 
There is thus a quite striking sense of optimism in Macklem’s presentation of international 
labour rights: a happy coincidence of the ought and the is. As a scholar of labour law, one 
cannot help but question whether such optimism can truly be justified; and, further, if it 
cannot, what this might imply for Macklem’s claim to have accounted for international 
human rights. With these thoughts in mind, I turn now to consider recent developments in 
European Union (EU) law, which speak to the relationship between sovereignty and labour 
rights in an era of globalization. My argument, which I develop in this and the next part of the 
paper, is that although Macklem acknowledges the potential for free trade agreements and 
other aspects of the liberalization of trade and finance to disadvantage workers, he appears to 
overestimate the capacity of international human rights to guard against this danger; to 
‘mitigate’, as he puts it, the consequences. 
 
 
(i) The embedded liberalism of the European Union: Keynes at home, Smith abroad 
 
At the heart of the European Union lies a project to create a single market within which 
goods, services, capital and labour can move freely across borders. In the mid-1950s, as the 
foundation of the Union’s forerunner (the European Economic Community or EEC) was 
debated, a decision was taken to make only very limited provision in the foundational Treaty 
for the creation or enforcement of labour standards at the ‘European’ level. The intention was 
that these should remain squarely within the jurisdiction of the member states. While 
economic rights to free movement for goods, services, capital and labour should be enshrined 
as fundamental within the Treaty, labour rights and rights to social welfare need barely figure 
                                                 
26 Ibid at 97-8. The meaning of ‘core’ ILO conventions or ‘core’ labour standards is addressed in part 3 below. 
27 Ibid at 99. 
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at all. Referring to the work of Karl Polanyi and John Ruggie, Ashiagbor has spoken in this 
context of the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the EU.28 
The European integration project involved embedding the [supranational] internal 
market within national social policy. This was predicated on the ability of these 
industrialised nations to alleviate any adverse impact of market integration through 
national systems of employment protection and social welfare, and to fund social 
policy interventions.29 
 
Without recounting in any detail the history of the EU since 1957, it may be observed that 
there has been significant movement away from the original constitutional settlement in 
respect of social policy and labour law. Acting over the course of several decades on the basis 
of a complex set of rationales and political objectives, the European institutions have greatly 
extended their ‘legislative competence’ in the field, adopting a sizable body of legislation 
such as could fill a whole textbook devoted to the subject of ‘European Labour Law’.30 In 
respect of its specific subject matter, however, this is a strange body of law indeed.31 As 
Freedland noted in the late 1990s, EU labour law deals with, ‘collective dismissals and 
acquired rights on the transfer of undertakings, rather than with the termination of the 
employment relationship generally; with particulars of the terms of the contract of 
employment, rather than with the terms themselves…’; with worker rights to be informed and 
consulted by the employer, but not with collective bargaining or the right to strike.32 
Notwithstanding the development of shared competence over labour law and social policy, 
certain matters – including, importantly, freedom of association – remain outside the 
legislative competence of the EU, and instead within the jurisdiction of the various member 
states.33 Moreover, as Ashiagbor notes, ‘attempts at the EU level to shore up working and 
                                                 
28 Diamond Ashiagbor, ‘Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the 
Context of EU Market Integration.' (2013) 19 European Law Journal 303, citing Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston MA: Beacon Press, 2001); John 
Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic 
Order,’ (1982) 36 Int’l Organization 379. 
29 Ashiagbor, ‘Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain’ supra note 28 at 307. 
30 The leading text in English is Catherine Barnard, EU Employment Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012)  
31 Mark Freedland, ‘Employment policy’ in Paul Davies et al (eds), European Community Labour Law: 
Principles and Perspectives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
32 Ibid at 278-9. 
33 Art 4(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU] provides for shared competence. 
Freedom of association is a fundamental right under EU law, but its protection as such is limited. See eg Art 28 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states: ‘Workers and employers, or their respective 
organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective 
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living standards in the face of economic liberalisation have principally taken the form of 
supporting the Member States in so doing’.34 For these reasons, the broad pattern of cross-
border trade liberalisation ‘embedded’ in national systems of social welfare and labour rights 
(Adam Smith abroad, John Maynard Keynes at home) continues to be quite easily discernible 
in the EU today. 
 
The pattern is also discernible, of course, in the international order as it was designed in 
Bretton Woods.35 By virtue of the operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and by reason of the nature of international labour standards (addressed as they are 
to nation states), the pursuit of social justice was confined within national borders, while 
economic activity was allowed, increasingly, to ignore them. The pattern is reflected again in 
the – by now fairly standard – practice, noted by Macklem, of appending to bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements ‘side agreements’ by which signatory states bind themselves to 
respect and enforce their own national labour laws. The rationale underlying such agreements 
is that an undertaking of this type should guard against the possibility of a race to the bottom, 
or any other form of social dumping that might be occasioned or encouraged by the freeing 
up of trade across national borders. Even as trade and trade law become increasingly global, 
so the reasoning seems to go, labour law can remain national and yet effective. 
 
Not addressed by such labour side-agreements (and neither by Macklem) is the possibility 
that the terms of a trade agreement might positively require a signatory state to lower, or 
disapply, its national labour standards. It was just such a possibility that fell to be considered 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the landmark cases of Viking and Laval, 
both of 2007.36 In the first of these, the Court ruled that when organising industrial action in a 
manner that was lawful under the relevant national rules, a trade union had breached the 
freedom of establishment of a shipping company, which had sought to replace its Finnish flag 
with an Estonian one.37 In the second, the Court found similarly that by – otherwise lawfully 
– organising industrial action, a trade union had breached the freedom to provide cross-border 
                                                 
action to defend their interests, including strike action’. My emphasis. The significance of this phrase is 
discussed below. 
34 Ashiagbor, ‘Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain’ supra note 28 at 308. 
35 Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock, ‘Conceptualizing Transnational Labour Law’ in Adelle Blackett and 
Anne Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2015) at 22. 
36 Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet 2007 ECR I-11767; Case C-438/05 International 
Transport Workers’ Union v Viking 2007 ECR I-10779.    
37 Freedom of establishment is guaranteed under Article 49 TFEU. 
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services of a Latvian construction company, which had contracted to build a school in 
Sweden.38 In both cases, the Court thus held that the relevant (EU) market freedom was 
applicable horizontally such that it ought to have been respected by the trade union. 
Nationally protected labour rights, including the right to strike, should only be exercised, 
according to the Court, in ways which respected the supranationally protected market 
freedoms of others. 
 
As the extensive and ever-growing literature on these cases suggests, there is very much that 
could be said about the Court’s reasoning and its implications for the legal systems of the 
Union and the member states.39 For present purposes, the most significant aspect of the 
decisions is their apparent contradiction of the logic that informed the foundational Treaty of 
Rome, that economic integration through the creation of a single market did not require the 
harmonization of social standards throughout the Union.40 In Laval and Viking, and in the 
subsequent case of Rüffert, the Court reasoned contrary to that logic that differences in 
labour standards between member states can give rise, in and of themselves, to restrictions of 
free movement.41 Where that is the case, such differences ought to be removed. And if they 
are not to be removed by means of upwards harmonization – which is highly unlikely given 
the political and practical difficulties involved in drafting and agreeing common labour 
standards, all the greater in an EU of 28 member states – then the Court is quite prepared to 
oversee the dismantling or weakening of established national standards. The fact that the 
national standards in question have the status of fundamental rights in the EU legal order will 
not prevent them figuring as unlawful restrictions of free movement, since fundamental 
rights have only to be protected ‘in accordance with Community law’.42    
 
In his hugely insightful analysis of the Laval and Viking decisions, Fritz Scharpf has 
highlighted the stark ‘institutional asymmetry’ in the European Union.43 The Court of Justice, 
                                                 
38 Freedom to provide cross-border services is guaranteed under Article 56 TFEU. 
39 For an excellent overview of the jurisprudence and most important lines of academic enquiry see Catherine 
Barnard, ‘Labour Law and the Internal Market’ in Barnard, EU Employment Law, supra note 30. 
40 Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, ‘European Labour Law after Laval’ in Marie-Ange Moreau (ed), 
Before and After the Economic Crisis: What Implications for the ‘European Social Model’? (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2011) at 261. 
41 Ibid at 261.  Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989 
42 For discussion see Tonia Novitz, ‘The Right to Strike as a Human Right’ (2007-08) 10 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Law  
43 Fritz Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 211 at 211-4. 
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he suggests, is impelled by a ‘liberalizing’ dynamic of its own making.44 The questions and 
cases which come before it tend always to ‘reflect the interest of parties who have a major 
economic or personal stake in increased factor or personal mobility as well as the financial 
and organizational resources to pursue this interest’.45 Parties with an interest in the 
maintenance of existing national laws and regulations are not heard. Moreover, the only 
remedy that the Court can offer private litigants is to disallow those national regulations that 
are found to hinder free movement. ‘What the Court cannot do is to establish a common 
European regime that would respond to some of the values and policy purposes, which, as a 
consequence of its decisions, can no longer be realized at the national level.’46 Nor can the 
Court’s inability to rule in a way that would create common labour standards at the 
supranational level be easily addressed by political action. Given the ever-increasing diversity 
of national interests and preferences in an enlarged EU, political agreement on common 
labour standards is likely to be ‘nearly impossible’ to achieve.47 For as long as that is the 
case, Scharpf concludes, a European ‘social market’ economy simply cannot be.48   
 
What of the capacity of international, as opposed to supranational, law, to mitigate against the 
‘adverse consequences’ for workers of the law of the single market: the weakening of rights 
to take collective action and the consequent lowering of terms and conditions? In the 
aftermath of the Laval and Viking decisions, appeals were made to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) by national actors claiming that national labour laws no longer conformed 
with international labour rights. In the case of Sweden and of the UK, the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) confirmed that 
this was the case.49 With that, the ball was placed squarely in the courts of national 
governments: would they now legislate so as to bring their laws back into line with 
international standards? At the time of writing, the answer to this question remains to be seen. 
                                                 
44 Ibid at 222. In Barnard’s opinion, the adoption by the Court of the ‘market access’ approach made it 
inevitable that collective action should be judged a restriction on freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services: Barnard, ‘Labour Law and the Internal Market’ supra note 39 at 207. 
45 Scharpf, ‘Asymmetry of European Integration’ supra note 43 at 221. 
46 Ibid at 223. 
47 Ibid at 217. 
48 Ibid at 217, referring to the commitment in Article 3(3) of the Lisbon Treaty to create a European social 
market economy. 
49 ILO, 99th Session, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (2010), and ILO, 100th Session, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations (2011) (United Kingdom); ILO CEACR, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations International Labour Conference, 102nd 
Session, 2013 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2013) (Sweden) 
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In Sweden, it seems that further reform of the law is likely, and that the report of the CEACR 
may have some influence in shaping the nature of the reform.50 In the UK, in contrast, 
legislation to bring the law into line with international standards is extremely unlikely, 
barring the fairy-tale ending of an election of a Labour Government under Jeremy Corbyn. 
Whatever the policy objectives of a particular national government, however, it remains the 
case that any constraints upon a government’s freedom of action that exist by reason of 
international trade or loan agreements will apply as much to law reform as they did to the 
original set of labour standards. It is notable, in this context, that when proposals were made 
in Romania recently to amend laws to bring them back into conformity with international 
labour standards, the IMF and European Commission were quick to warn the national 
Government that it should: ‘limit any amendments … to revisions necessary to bring the law 
into compliance with core ILO conventions’.51 
 
 
(ii) Ceding sovereignty to one’s creditors 
 
Quite independently of the Court of Justice, the freedom of EU member states to shape their 
labour laws and labour market institutions has been restricted since 1992 by reason of the 
adoption of the programme for economic and monetary union.52 As was explained by 
commentators at the time, the terms of the programme tied member states into a 
macroeconomic policy framework, dictated from above, which drastically limited their 
autonomy to manage their economies.53 In particular, the framework obliged member states 
to keep budget deficits and public debt low, to restrict public borrowing and fiscal 
adjustments, and to adopt interest rates set by the European Central Bank (ECB), in line with 
its obligation to prioritise price stability over other objectives, including full employment. As 
a result, the framework served to rule out many of the instruments traditionally employed by 
                                                 
50 See the Report of the Committee on Posted Workers, “SOU 2015:83 Översyn av Lex Laval” (Overview of 
Lex Laval), presented to the Swedish Government on 30 September 2015. For discussion see: 
http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national%3Cbr%3Elabour_law/national_legislation/legislative_developments/
prm/109/v__detail/id__6321/category__1/index.html accessed 20 June, 2016. 
51 Confidential document leaked to the International Trade Union Confederation, cited by Keith Ewing, ‘The 
Death of Social Europe’ (2015) 26 King's Law Journal 76 at 91.  
52 Incorporated into the Treaty of Maastricht. For discussion, see Zoe Adams and Simon Deakin, ‘Structural 
Adjustment, Economic Governance and Social Policy in a Regional Context: The Case of the Eurozone Crisis’ 
in Blackett and Trebilcock, Research Handbook, supra n 35. 
53 Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Neo-Voluntarism: a New European Social Policy Regime?’ (1995) European Law 
Journal 31 at 56. 
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countries seeking to stimulate growth and job creation. Of course, the very idea of economic 
and monetary union ruled out the option of devaluing a national currency as a means of 
improving competitiveness and stimulating growth. That being the case, the most obvious 
alternative left open to countries seeking to improve their competitiveness relative to other 
member states was to adjust welfare state provisions and labour rights and standards 
downwards in order to compete on the basis of low labour costs.   
 
Prior to 2009, the impact of economic and monetary union on the labour laws of member 
states appears to have been limited.54 On the face of it, at least, national labour laws 
remained mostly stable throughout the 2000s, albeit within a context of trade union decline 
and growing inequality between lower and higher earners. Beginning in late 2009, however, 
the sovereign debt crisis which followed the public bail-outs of the ‘too big to fail’ banks, 
resulted in quite radical changes to national labour laws.55 In response to the crisis, the EU 
pursued policies of ‘internal devaluation’, imposing these more or less directly on member 
states. In the case of Portugal, Ireland and, most dramatically, Greece, the ‘Troika’ of the 
European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF required, as a condition of 
loans, that existing labour laws, terms and conditions of employment, and social benefits be 
cut.56 In respect of countries which were not in receipt of loans, Spain and Italy, the Troika 
otherwise exerted significant pressure in favour of similar drastic measures. Even in non-
Eurozone countries, such as the UK, its blueprint of deregulation as the best means of 
addressing budget deficits and public debt was influential in shaping proposed reforms of 
labour laws.57 The logic behind these policies was a straightforward extension of the logic 
embodied in the original programme for economic and monetary union: with the aim of 
restoring the competitiveness of national economies and ensuring economic growth, states 
should undergo a process of internal devaluation so that they could compete with wealthier 
states on the basis of low labour costs.   
                                                 
54 Simon Deakin and Aristea Koukiadaki, ‘The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Evolution of Labour Law in Europe’ 
in Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland (eds), Re-Socializing Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) at part 2. 
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To a Troika apparently convinced that its policy prescriptions reflected what was necessary to 
ensure the recovery of national economies, and the repayments of their loans, the labour 
rights of workers in the debtor nations of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, have been of little 
import. Neither the terms of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights – legally 
binding since 2009 – nor additional EU Treaty commitments to respect the values of ‘human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and ... human rights’ have acted as any 
kind of brake on those intent on pursuing deregulatory reforms. Confirmation, if any was 
needed, that the reforms breach the labour rights of workers – European, national, and 
international labour rights – came after the event, from the European Committee of Social 
Rights, the Greek Council of State, and the ILO’s CEACR.58 Commenting on Greek 
measures aimed at decentralizing collective bargaining, the CEACR concluded that these 
were ‘likely to have a significant – and potentially devastating – impact on the industrial 
relations system in the country’; that ‘the entire foundation of collective bargaining in the 
country may be vulnerable to collapse under [the] new framework’.59 Far from acting to 
reverse the changes in light of the ILO’s conclusions, however, the Greek Government has 
been working in recent years – on the instructions of the Troika – on proposals to restrict 
labour rights yet further, especially rights to protection against unfair dismissal and to take 
collective action.60  
 
 
3. Monitoring and Mitigating the Consequences of the Exercise of Sovereignty? 
 
The Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 contains an expression of the aspiration of the ILO 
which resonates with Macklem’s articulation of the normative basis of international labour 
rights, emphasising the potential significance of the ‘external’ as well as ‘internal’ exercise of 
sovereign power by nation states for the human rights and interests of workers. 
‘[A]ll human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both 
their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and 
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dignity, or economic security and equal opportunity… [A]ll national and international 
policies and measures, in particular those of an economic and financial character, 
should be judged in this light and accepted only in so far as they may be held to 
promote and not to hinder the achievement of this fundamental objective’.61 
 
Today, the Declaration continues to form part of the Constitution of the ILO. It is quite clear, 
nonetheless, that the capacity of international labour rights to fulfil these aims is limited. As 
drafted in the form of Conventions or Recommendations, international labour rights are 
intended for incorporation by nation states into their own individual domestic legal systems. 
They are not addressed to private or non-state actors – transnational corporations, banks and 
other financial institutions, supranational regulatory bodies – and do not, of themselves, 
create duties binding upon such actors.62 Their potential reach is coextensive with the – 
separate – jurisdictions of those Member States which are bound to incorporate them, and 
limited just as those jurisdictions are limited. So, for example, while Convention 87 directs 
Member States to ‘take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and 
employers may exercise freely the right to organise’, it does not contemplate a right to 
collective bargaining, or to organise or take part in industrial action, beyond the borders of 
the State in question.63 It does not require Member States, in other words, to guarantee the 
rights of workers to take part in coordinated transnational industrial action, or international 
collective bargaining.  
 
In 1998, the ILO adopted a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.64 
Under the terms of that Declaration, four international labour standards were designated as 
core, which all member states had an obligation to respect: freedom of association, the 
prohibition of forced labour, the effective abolition of child labour, and the elimination of 
discrimination in employment.65 Here, as Macklem notes, was an attempt, ‘to achieve a 
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degree of moral, political and legal consensus on what constitutes universally recognized 
labor rights’.66 In creating a short list of four standards, the ILO implicitly extended an 
invitation not only to member states, but to a much wider range of public and private actors to 
acknowledge and respect them. It appeared to recognise, in doing so, that these standards 
might assume different institutional forms in different economic contexts. For some 
commentators, this represented a positive move towards ensuring the continued relevance of 
the ILO and international labour standards in a globalized world.67 Others feared that 
detaching the standards from the Conventions in which they were embodied, and thereby 
allowing actors’ significant freedom to interpret them themselves, might result in the 
standards becoming ‘hollowed out’; that, anyway, the designation of four standards as ‘core’, 
would imply necessarily the lesser importance of all other ‘non-core’ standards.68 The 
concern, then, was that the Declaration might serve to provide actors with an easy way of 
cloaking themselves in a rather thin veil of legitimacy: that of respect for core labour 
standards very narrowly understood.69 
 
As narrated above, recent developments in the EU may be understood to highlight certain 
features of the relation between sovereignty and international labour rights in an era of 
globalization, which explain why – from a perspective of concern for the interests and fair 
treatment of workers – the limited reach of those rights has become a matter of growing 
concern. The failure of international labour rights to ‘mitigate adverse consequences 
produced by the international deployment of legal sovereignty’ (to use Macklem’s words) is 
not due simply to the fact that those rights are not always respected as they ought to be. 
Rather, it follows from the nature of the rights themselves, from the limitation by nation 
states of their sovereignty, and the consequent liberation or empowerment of a variety of 
public and private actors, who are not bound by international law. As states act in ways which 
restrict their ability to enact and enforce labour rights, or to retain and enforce existing rights 
and standards, continued respect for the four core labour standards is now routinely 
emphasised. 
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(i) Trade agreements and labour standards 
 
In the process of signing free trade agreements, nation states may surrender elements of their 
sovereignty, voluntarily restricting their ability to raise labour standards or even maintain and 
enforce existing standards. They do this not only by creating economic conditions which may 
encourage a race-to-the-bottom, but also by legally binding themselves to dismantle barriers 
to trade and market freedoms, even if such barriers take the form of labour rights or long-
established practices of collective bargaining. Within the EU, as we have seen, the 
designation of labour laws or collective bargaining practices as barriers to free trade is 
facilitated by the particular architecture of the Union: the ‘asymmetry’ identified by Scharpf. 
Free trade rules are entrenched as fundamental in the supranational Treaty, labour standards 
are protected by national law, and – by reason of the development by the Court of two legal 
doctrines, the doctrine of direct effect and the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law – the 
former have ‘constitutional priority’ over the latter.70 EU law – and rights to free movement 
in particular – figure as a form of higher law within the legal systems of Member States: as a 
set of norms which national institutions are powerless to amend or overrule, but obliged to 
enforce. It follows that where the exercise of labour rights conflicts with the exercise of free 
movement rights, the former are understood to breach the latter – and not vice versa. This 
asymmetry poses a significant challenge to the continued viability of the embedded liberalism 
that has formed the basis of the European Social Model, undermining the capacity of nation 
states to maintain the systems of social protection which the notion of embeddedness 
presupposes. We find ourselves threatened instead with the disembedding of the single 
market, with increased levels of market exposure, and the disappearance for many of the 
normative stability and material security that they require in order to live a decent life.71  
 
Scharpf’s notion of ‘institutional asymmetry’ may be observed to have application beyond 
the particularities of the Constitution of the European Union. Considering such matters from 
a Canadian perspective, for example, Eric Tucker has identified a similar, significant 
imbalance in the Canadian Constitution – and, at a regional level, NAFTA and its labour 
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side-accord the NAALC – between the protection of private economic interests, on the one 
hand, and social and labour rights on the other.72 For Tucker, one of the most striking aspects 
of both the national and the supranational legal orders (the ‘new constitutionalism’) is the 
way in which they place the rights of capital beyond the reach of local or national state 
interference.73 Though the national Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not expressly 
protect property rights, for example, it does allow private actors to contest state restrictions of 
those rights.74 Legislation aimed at removing barriers to inter-provincial trade, meanwhile, 
limits the sovereignty of federal and provincial government to enact legislation that is 
restrictive of free trade rights.75 On the international stage, there are very obvious 
asymmetries between the legal rules and procedures which protect the free movement of 
goods and capital as compared with the free movement of workers, the rights and interests of 
investors as compared with those of workers.76 The huge difficulties involved in agreeing 
new international labour standards within the ILO, or even maintaining longstanding 
agreement over the interpretation of existing standards,77 contrast starkly with the pace and 
reach of market liberalisation and expansion which once ‘unleashed’ acquire a momentum of 
their own.78  
 
Despite the threat which it has been shown to pose to labour standards within the EU, the 
model of a multilateral trade agreement which grants justiciable rights of free movement to 
private actors looks set to be mirrored in a number of international trade agreements, 
including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) which the Partnership is understood to comprise. The text of the 
TTIP has not yet been published but, on the basis of other trade agreements being negotiated 
by the EU, it may be assumed that the TTIP will include a commitment on the part of 
signatory states to respect core labour standards.79 Again on the basis of these other 
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agreements, it may be assumed that TTIP will not, however, provide for supranational 
machinery for the adjudication of disputes arising in connection with this commitment. Nor 
will it commit private actors, including transnational corporations, to respect labour rights. 
Instead, signatory states will be required to promote compliance and effectively enforce their 
own domestic labour laws by permitting legal action within national courts and tribunals, and 
requiring the provision of labour inspectors. Herein lies the asymmetry. As Ewing and Hendy 
explain:  
[U]nlike the citizens of Europe and the workers whom the labour chapters feign to  
acknowledge, corporations will be empowered by ISDS to sue States in secret 
arbitrations, in respect of democratically adopted policies and laws. In doing so, they 
will be able to override national, and indeed, Europe-wide courts, and so will be 
enabled to attack the very laws that the labour chapter is designed to promote.80 
 
 
(ii) Loan agreements and labour standards 
 
The recent history of the EMU involves two further instances of the voluntary surrender of 
elements of national sovereignty with implications for the ability of nation states to create and 
enforce labour standards: the European agreement on economic and monetary union, and the 
bail-out loans advanced by the Troika in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. In the 
first instance, member states signed up to tight, centralised controls of monetary policy and 
elements of economic policy, significantly limiting the range of options available to them as 
means of increasing their economic competitiveness. Later, in the face of the more or less 
immediate threat of sovereign default, debtor states ceded autonomy over large areas of social 
and economic policy in exchange for financial assistance. In their discussion of these events, 
Adams and Deakin have characterised the actions of the Troika in respect of Greece and 
other states with reference to the notion of ‘structural adjustment’, emphasising similarities 
with the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed by the IMF on developing 
countries from the 1980s.81 
 If the experience of SAPs in the developing world is anything to go by, Europe’s  
                                                 
80 Ewing and Hendy, TTIP and Labour Rights, at 7. 
81 Adams and Deakin, ‘Structural Adjustment’ supra note 52. 
20 
 
experiment in structural adjustment is likely to lead to higher unemployment, lower 
growth, and increased inequalities … A fundamental overhaul of economic and 
monetary policy is needed if the European social model, and with it the wider 
European project, is to survive and prosper.82  
 
The picture drawn by Adams and Deakin appears at first sight to contrast starkly with 
Macklem’s discussion of the practices of international lenders and their growing tendency, 
which he highlights, to require debtors to respect core labour rights as a condition of loan 
agreements.83 Further light is cast upon the matter by Franz Ebert.84 Focusing on the IMF, 
Ebert describes the ‘ambiguous character’ of the institution’s attitude to labour standards, 
involving both the promotion of certain minimum standards and the ‘flexibilisation’ of 
domestic labour law. Importantly, Ebert concludes that while the IMF has ‘sporadically’ 
promoted minimum standards, ‘its role as a labour law deregulator has prevailed, often with 
significant effects on the protection of workers’.85 So, for example, between 1998 and 2005, 
almost a third of all Letters of Intent addressed to the IMF included commitments to render 
domestic labour markets more ‘flexible’.86 In other cases, deregulatory reforms were not 
explicit conditions of the programmes but were pushed through formal or informal political 
channels.87 Subsequent to the implementation of its proposed labour law reforms by debtor 
nations, the IMF did not take steps systematically to assess the effects thereof on workers.88 
 
 
(iii) Cross-border services and labour standards 
 
A final element of the recent history of EU law which speaks to the relation of sovereignty 
and international labour rights is the treatment of workers in the context of the cross-border 
provision of services. As interpreted by the CJEU in the case of Laval, the Posted Workers 
Directive may be understood to place significant limits on the sovereignty of a ‘host state’, 
requiring it to ensure that workers ‘posted’ from outside its borders benefit from a fixed list 
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of national minimum standards, and preventing it from imposing anything over and above 
those standards.89 The Directive does this by treating posted workers differently to other 
workers (who have rights under EU law to free movement and equal treatment), defining 
them instead primarily as a resource of the service-providing employer. The interest of the 
posted worker in being paid a fair wage is categorised by the Court accordingly as potentially 
restrictive of the employer’s right to provide cross-border services (protected as fundamental 
in the Treaty). And it is on that rationale that the posted worker is accorded no right to equal 
treatment with workers in the host state, but only to the limited set of minimum standards 
enumerated in the Directive.  
 
As a consequence of these European rules, it has become increasingly easy for employing 
companies to evade local terms and condition of employment, hard won in many cases 
through the efforts of trade unions, and guaranteed by national law or collective agreement.90 
Instead of hiring local workers, a company may choose to contract with an employment 
agency situated in a low-wage country to provide it with cheap labour – the employment 
agency being categorised in this context as a legal person exercising its freedom to provide 
cross-border services (and not cross-border labour). Alternatively, it may establish a ‘letter-
box’ subsidiary in a low-wage country, from which it can ‘post’ a cheaper workforce back to 
itself. Given the terms of the ruling in Laval, it will likely not be possible in such cases for 
trade unions to organise industrial action in an effort to persuade the service provider to pay 
the locally agreed going rate; nor for a local or national government to require the same.91 
Notwithstanding the threat that this model brings with it, then, of the undermining of local 
and national wage settlements and the lowering of wages for the many, the pattern has again 
been repeated at international level in the form of ‘Mode 4’ of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, or GATS.92 The rule there is that ‘posted’ workers should remain subject 
to the labour law applicable in their home state and their original contract of employment.  
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(iv) International labour rights, transnational labour law? 
 
In the story of the ‘unravelling’ of the embedded liberal bargain of the EU, the limited reach 
of international labour rights reveals itself.93 Such rights did not prevent Member States from 
signing the Treaty of Rome, or more recently the bail-out loan agreements, since in neither 
case did the act of signing itself constitute a breach of labour rights. (Indeed, the 
consequences for labour standards of the creation of a ‘common market’ were not even fully 
understood, or acknowledged, at the time of signing.94) Nor did international labour rights 
bind supranational institutions, such as the CJEU or EU legislature, when adjudicating or 
legislating to resolve conflicts arising between the exercise of market freedoms, on the one 
hand, and labour standards, on the other, since such rights, by their very nature, are addressed 
only to nation states. Instead, international labour rights were appealed to by trade unions and 
others only after domestic labour standards had been lowered in Member States, and worker 
protections weakened – either as a result of the CJEU ruling that they constituted breaches of 
companies’ rights to free movement, or as required by the Troika as terms of bail-out loans. 
In several cases, this resulted in a finding of the CEACR that national law breached 
international labour standards. Notwithstanding such findings, however, member states 
remained bound by the terms of the same trade agreements or loan agreements that had 
required them in the first place to weaken their labour laws. As it set out to legislate so as to 
remedy its breach of international law, Romania, it may be recalled, was directed by its 
institutional creditors to do no more than was necessary to bring the law into compliance with 
core ILO conventions.95 Greece, meanwhile, was instructed to weaken its labour protections 
yet further. 
 
Among scholars in the fields of both international law and labour law, the limitations of 
international labour rights that I describe have long been recognised.96 In recent years, it has 
become quite commonplace to speak not only of international labour law, but also of 
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transnational labour law.97 In recounting the story of the protection of workers interests at the 
supranational level, we may still begin with international labour rights (as Dave Trubeck put 
it), but we do not anymore end with them.98 What is meant by transnational labour law? 
Sometimes the term is used descriptively of existing rules or institutions, sometimes to 
announce a kind of desiderata: the rights and regulation that would be necessary to deliver 
social justice in a globalised world. In either case, it would be wrong to assume that scholars 
have in mind a coherent system when they speak of transnational labour law. In stark contrast 
to the ILO and to the impressive body of international labour rights that it has authored over 
the decades, there is, of course, no transnational labour code in existence, and no 
transnational regulatory body capable of issuing or supervising one. The label ‘transnational 
labour law’ is applied instead to a wide range of separate endeavours in which scholars may 
discern an emerging body or bodies of law capable of both buttressing domestic laws and 
supplementing ILO standards:99 regional trade agreements and labour side accords, but also 
corporate codes, consumer-led or -focussed initiatives, international framework agreements 
reached between TNCs and trade union federations.100 The vision is decidedly pluralistic, 
embracing activities at many levels, and actors of many types: private, public, local, national 
and supranational. Nation states figure as centres of political power, but there is recognition 






In the introductory chapters of his book, Macklem explains in general terms what he 
understands to be the relation between sovereignty and international human rights. Referring 
to the external as well as internal exercise of sovereign power, he acknowledges the 
possibility of what I have referred to in this paper as the ‘voluntary surrender’ by nation states 
of elements of their sovereignty. ‘A treaty can create legally binding obligations on signatory 
States to exercise their sovereign powers in certain ways and not others and in relation to 
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certain matters and not others.’101 When the discussion focusses upon international labour 
rights, however, it is as if this insight has been partially forgotten, or its implications not fully 
interrogated. While Macklem recognises that free trade agreements might encourage a ‘race 
to the bottom’, for example, he makes no mention of the possibility that they might require a 
signatory state to lower, or disapply, its labour standards.102 When considering the 
significance of international loan agreements, he emphasises the fact that creditors may 
sometimes require borrowers to comply with core international labour rights as a condition of 
their loan agreements, but omits any reference to the arguably more common practice of the 
imposition by creditors of SAPs.103 
 
When states act to limit their own capacity to enforce labour standards, spaces are created 
within which private actors are empowered to structure working relationships to their own 
benefit beyond the reach of ‘state interference’ in the form of national labour laws. The 
absence at a supranational level of democratic institutions with the capacity to enact – and 
enforce – supranational labour standards means that the surrender of national sovereignty 
cannot easily be compensated for at the supranational level. The result is the kind of 
‘asymmetry’ identified by Scharpf, Tucker and others. If international labour rights were to 
perform the role ascribed to them by Macklem of legitimising the international legal order 
then they would have to address such asymmetry, placing limits on the exercise of economic 
as well as sovereign power, binding, especially, transnational corporations and serving to 
limit the exercise of their legal rights when it conflicted with the rights and interests of 
workers. They would have to be addressed to, and respected by, supranational as well as 
national actors. 
 
There is then, I would suggest, a significant measure of divergence between the normative 
dimension, or mission, that Macklem assigns to international labour rights and the capacity of 
those rights to fulfil that mission; between the ought and the is of international labour rights, 
as he defines them. Perhaps Macklem would defend his account by arguing that the mission 
he identifies is more modest than I have suggested here: that international labour rights, and 
international human rights more broadly, have only to furnish the international legal order 
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with a ‘measure’ of legitimacy in order to fulfil their role.104 Perhaps he would remind me 
that he seeks to construct a theory of international human rights that is internal to public 
international law, arguing, for that reason, that my talk of private actors and non-state power 
is misplaced. Doubts would remain, I suggest, regarding his claim to have identified a ‘truth’ 
about international labour rights.105 In an era of globalization, these are better understood as 
one very important element of a nascent – as yet underdeveloped but patently necessary – 
system of transnational labour law. 
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